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Regular state unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are paid from state reserves held in 
unemployment trust fund accounts at the U.S. Treasury.  Employers covered by the federal-state 
UI system make contributions to reserve accounts based on taxable wages.  The federal 
government provides incentives for forward funding of benefits to support UI as an automatic 
macroeconomic stabilizer in the economy.  However, the Great Recession exhausted UI reserves 
for the majority of states, and not all of them have yet replenished those reserves.  Based on 
patterns observed over the past 40 years, in this paper we simulate the effects on state and 
systemwide reserves supposing that a mild, moderate, or severe recession emerges in the coming 
months.  Our results suggest that even a moderate recession would cause a majority of states to 
exhaust UI reserves and be forced to borrow to pay regular UI benefits.  We note that recent 
experience with federal funding of extended and emergency benefits may have contributed to the 
current state UI financing posture, and we suggest that the taxable wage bases are insufficient.  
The UI system exists to help involuntarily jobless Americans while they are between jobs.  By 
accepted standards of adequacy, benefit provisions are not excessive, but limits in the financing 
system make it slow to recover from debt.  State reserve funds have not yet reached levels 
sufficient to weather another economic storm. 
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There is increasing concern that the current U.S. economic expansion is fading and the 
risk of recession is rising.  This has raised questions about whether the federal-state 
unemployment insurance (UI) system is adequately prepared for another recession.1  High 
unemployment in the Great Recession severely drained state UI reserve accounts, resulting in 
widespread borrowing.  Thirty-six of 53 state UI programs took loans to pay regular UI benefits 
during the most recent crisis.2  Most states used the normal UI benefit financing procedure 
available from the U.S. Treasury under Title XII of the Social Security Act, but several issued 
state revenue bonds.  Despite federal assistance that helped many indebted states during the 
crisis, as of January 2016, 10 states still had outstanding loan or bond debts.3  Four state UI 
programs (California, Connecticut, Ohio, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which is counted as a 
state) are still paying on loans from the U.S. Treasury, while six other states (Colorado, Illinois, 
Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas) are still repaying other loans or bond debts from UI 
benefit payments.  In this paper, we briefly review the aggregate history of UI benefit financing, 
then simulate the financial impacts on individual state UI reserve positions of mild, moderate, 
and severe recessions.  
BACKGROUND ON UI RESERVES 
The U.S. Department of Labor defines the UI reserve ratio as the reserve balance divided 
by total wages paid in UI-covered employment.   Combining net reserve balances for all states, 
we can look at the aggregate system reserve ratio.  The solid curve in Figure 1 presents a long-
                                                 
1 See for example the recent essays by Casselman (2016), Stettner (2016), and Vroman (2016).   
2 In addition to the 50 states, UI operates in Washington, DC, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
3 Temporary waivers to states on loan interest from UI debts accumulated during the recession are explained in 
Chocolaad, Vroman, and Hobbie (2013).   
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term picture of the funding adequacy of the UI system by looking at the combined net UI system 
reserve ratio for all 53 programs.  This net measure reduces balances for any Title XII 
borrowing, but it does not account for debt financed by state issuance of bonds and other loans.  
The UI system reserve ratio was around 2 percent of total wages before both the 1991 and the 
2001 recessions.  During each of those recessions, more than a dozen states were forced to 
borrow, but the combined system stayed positive throughout those recessions.  Before the Great 
Recession, however, system reserves were only 0.80 percent of total wages, and well more than 
half of all state UI systems went into debt during that crisis.  As shown in Figure 1, the combined 
system reserve ratio had recovered to only 0.67 percent of total wages by the end of 2015.4   
 
SOURCE: USDOL (2015). 
 
Our approach to simulating impacts of future recessions on individual state reserve 
positions is to look at net reserves as a proportion of UI taxable wages (Figure 1).  We focus on 
this ratio because the level of taxable wages drives reserve recovery for a given state tax 
                                                 
4 Total and taxable wages in Figures 1 and 2 for the second half of 2015 are estimated values.  The UI reserve 
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Figure 1  Reserve Ratios for the UI System—Combined Net Reserves of All 53 States and Territories as
a Percentage of Total and Taxable Wages, 1938–2015
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structure.  Reserve ratios defined on taxable wages are more volatile because the denominator in 
the ratio is only a fraction of total wages, yielding a ratio that varies more widely.  Taxable wage 
bases, which determine the size of total taxable payrolls, vary across states and are an indicator 
of state attitudes toward the idea of forward funding UI benefits.  The federal taxable wage base 
has been fixed at $7,000 per worker since 1983, and state taxable wage bases must be at least as 
high as the federal level.  While only two states have UI-taxable wage bases equal to $7,000, 
many states have not strayed far above that level.  More than half of all states (28) have taxable 
wage bases at or below double the federal level ($14,000).   
Figure 2 contrasts the federal UI taxable wage base (UITWB) with the Social Security 
taxable wage base (SSTWB).  Both were originally set in 1936 to be $3,000, which at that time 
covered about 98 percent of all wages and salaries paid in the country.  The SSTWB was 
increased five times between 1951 and 1971. In 1972, reforms included a plan for increasing and 
indexing the SSTWB. In 1982 the SSTWB indexing was refined, and in 2015 it reached 
$118,500.  The UITWB has been increased only three times, in 1972, in 1978, and most recently 
in 1983 to $7,000.  The divergence between the SSTWB and UITWB is shown by the blue and 
red bars, respectively, in Figure 2.  The impact of the low UI taxable wage base on the ratio of 
taxable to total wages in UI-covered employment is shown by the dotted line graph in Figure 2, 
which had a level of 0.98 in 1938 but had fallen to 0.27 by 2015.  The capacity of the UI benefit 




SOURCE:  USDOL (2015). 
THE FORWARD FUNDING PRINCIPLE 
For a state UI system to be sustainable over the long run, on average, revenues should 
match expenditures over business cycles.  The accepted policy standard for UI benefit financing 
is based on the principle of forward funding.  Having money in reserves when unemployment 
increases means states do not have to raise employer UI taxes immediately during recessions.  
Therefore, forward funding prevents UI financing from driving the economy into a worse 
situation when business conditions are weak.  Accumulating reserves during economic 
recoveries puts a slight damper on expansions but helps avoid severe financing crises in the 
depths of recessions. To achieve adequate forward funding, state accounts in the federal 
Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should maintain balances “sufficient to pay at least one year 
of unemployment insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous ‘high cost’” (ACUC 
1996, p. 11).5  In 2010, this rule was put into place as a federal requirement for interest-free 
                                                 
5 The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) was the most recent federal advisory 








































































Figure 2   UI- and Social Security-Taxable Wage Bases and the Ratio of Total to 
UI-Taxable Wages, 1937–2015 
SS-Taxable Wage Base UI-Taxable Wage Base Tax/total ratio
(UI taxable wages/total wages)
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short-term Title XII loans.  The final regulation on this matter was published by the U.S. 
Department of Labor (USDOL) in the Federal Register on September 17, 2010, as 20 CFR, Part 
606.   
As an incentive for states to maintain adequate forward funding of UI benefits, the new 
USDOL regulations set reserve requirements for states to maintain privileges for interest-free 
short-term loans.  The rules require states to hold one year of reserves in the UTF equal to the 
average of the three highest benefit payment rates (benefit payments divided by total payrolls) 
experienced in the previous 20 years. This rate is known as the average high-cost rate (AHCR).  
The new federal regulation required reserve balances to have a high-cost multiple (HCM) of 0.5 
in 2014, increasing by 10 percentage points a year to reach 1.0 in 2019 and thereafter.   
THE PAY-AS-YOU-GO ALTERNATIVE 
An alternative to forward funding, which some states prefer, is pay-as-you-go financing 
of benefits.  The fundamental principle of finance is that “money today is worth more than 
money tomorrow.”  By keeping employer UI taxes low, states may be reducing reserve balances, 
but they keep money in the hands of private-sector businesses, where jobs are created.  In today’s 
world of low interest rates, debt can be financed by tax-exempt state revenue bonds at interest 
rates far below the Title XII borrowing rates.  Some states have adopted this model, which is a 
rational cost-saving approach in a low-interest-rate environment.  Currently, interest rates on 
state revenue bond rates are about one-tenth the Title XII loan rates.  However, this will not 
always be the case.  When rates rise and the spreads between U.S. Treasury bonds and tax-
exempt state revenue bonds shrink or flip, forward funding will regain appeal.6  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
6 Interest rates for Title XII borrowing are based on U.S. Treasury bond rates. 
 
6 
switching financing schemes in times of crisis can be very costly to states.  Not only is forward 
funding a countercyclical stabilizer, it is a less risky policy option for states, since advance 
building of reserves is less risky than dealing with unexpected debt.   
IMBALANCE BETWEEN BENEFIT PAYMENTS AND TAX REVENUES 
Annual regular UI benefit payments totaled $30.5 billion in 2006 but reached a peak of 
$75.8 billion in 2009.  Reserves along with current tax revenues were not sufficient to cover 
benefit payments over the duration of the Great Recession in most states.  Systemwide Title XII 
borrowing totaled more than $141.3 billion from 2008 to 2012.  In recent years the system has 
been tilting toward structural debt, as shown in Figure 3.  Over the 50-year period from 1966 to 
2015, the percentage of taxable wages paid in UI-covered employment benefits averaged 2.54 
percent, while the percentage of taxable wages paid in tax payments averaged 2.37 percent—a 
deficiency of 7.2 percent (Figure 3).7  The imbalance between system disbursements and 
revenues worsened in the last half of that period.  During the first 25 years, benefits averaged 1.8 
percent more than tax contributions, while in the last 25 years, benefits averaged 12.2 percent 
more than tax contributions.  As shares of taxable wages, there has been a downward shift over 
time in both benefit payments and tax contributions, but recently tax payments have fallen more.  
This suggests both a declining rate of UI wage replacement and a declining capacity to finance 
even the lower benefit levels.   
                                                 
7 The ratio of benefits paid to total wages is called the benefit-cost rate.  Ratios are based on actual data for UI 
benefits paid and tax contributions.  Wage data for 2015 were estimated by multiplying actual 2014 wages by the 
year-over-year percentage change in wages for the first half of 2015 (wages for 2015Q1 plus 2015Q2 divided by 




SOURCE: USDOL (2015). 
 
The economic recovery that began in 1983 and continued through the 1990s resulted in a 
steady improvement in UI system reserves, which peaked at 2 percent of total wages and 5 
percent of taxable wages in 1989.  By 2000, after the early 1990s recession and healthy job gains 
in the late 1990s, but before the Y2K-dot-com bust, UI system reserves recovered to about 1.5 
percent of total wages and 4.8 percent of taxable wages.  With the relatively weak “jobless 
recovery” that followed, reserves reached only 0.8 percent of total wages and 2.9 percent of 
taxable wages before the Great Recession.  Consequently, by 2010, system reserves had fallen to 
−0.67 percent of total wages and −2.48 percent of taxable wages.  When the combined system is 
in a deficit position, net reserves are negative, and so is the reserve ratio.  If the United States is 
to be adequately prepared to weather a future severe recession, these historical data suggest that 
prerecession reserves should be close to 2.0 percent of total wages or 5.0 percent of taxable 
wages.  After several years of economic growth and labor market improvement, system net 
reserves had, by the end of 2015, recovered only to 0.67 percent of total wages and 2.53 percent 
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Figure 3  UI Benefits and Taxes as Percentages of Taxable Wages, 1966–2015 
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SIMULATING THE IMPACTS ON RESERVES FROM RECESSIONS 
To forecast which states might face the most severe difficulties in a near-term recession, 
we start by looking at the history of UI financing difficulties among individual states.  Alaska 
had the earliest difficulties, with negative net UI reserve balances in 1957–1963 (Figure 4).  
Connecticut and Washington were the only states to borrow in 1972 and 1973.  Following the 
severe recession in 1974–1975, brought on in part by the first OPEC oil embargo, the number of 
states with negative net UI reserves peaked at 20 in 1977.  Significant numbers of states had UI 
financing debts in each year from 1975 through 1986.  Despite the 1991 and 2001 recessions, 
fewer than five states had UI debt outstanding in any year from 1987 through 2008.  After a 
relatively long period of macroeconomic stability—sometimes called the Great Moderation—
unemployment benefit claims during the Great Recession drained UI reserves in many states, 
resulting in negative year-end net reserves in 30 states in 2010.   
 
























































































Figure 4  Number of States with Negative Net Reserves, 1957–2015
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EFFORTS TO RESTORE UI RESERVE POSITIONS 
In the early recovery stages of the Great Recession, several states took drastic actions to 
restore their UI reserve positions.  Nine states chose to cut UI benefit provisions.  Influenced by 
the nonreduction rules of the 2008 Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program, 
eight other states limited benefit reductions to shortening potential durations only.  North 
Carolina shortened the potential duration but also reduced the maximum weekly benefit amount 
from a formula-based $504 to a fixed $350, which will remain in effect until further legislative 
action.  This change, effective July 1, 2013, ended federal EUC payments to more than 70,000 
North Carolina UI beneficiaries and prevented others from receiving federally paid EUC through 
the end of 2013.   
Effective in January 2012, Michigan permanently cut the maximum duration of regular 
UI benefits from 26 to 20 weeks.  Georgia trimmed the maximum duration by the same amount, 
but varied it by linking it to the unemployment rate—that is, effective July 1, 2012, Georgia cut 
the maximum duration of benefits from 26 weeks to a range from 14 to 20 weeks, depending on 
the level of the unemployment rate.  Florida adopted a similar variable maximum approach, with 
the potential duration falling to 12 weeks if the unemployment rate is at or below 5 percent.  
Each 0.5 percentage-point increase above 5 percent adds one week to the maximum potential UI 
benefit duration in Florida, which peaks at 23 weeks for unemployment rates at or above 10.5 
percent.  In 2013, North Carolina adopted a variable maximum ranging from 12 to 20 weeks.   
States may have been emboldened to shorten regular UI durations by the generous federal 
extensions.  The federally funded extensions of UI in the Great Recession yielded potential 
durations of more than 26 weeks in all states and up to 99 weeks at times in some states.  Figure 
5 shows the share of total UI payments that were federally paid in recession years dating back to 
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1958.  The three recession years with the highest federal payment shares of all benefits occurred 
during the Great Recession.  The all-time maximum was in 2011, when the federal government 
paid 55.7 percent of all UI benefits.  This may have created an expectation among states that the 
federal government would always provide generous emergency extensions of UI benefits when 
unemployment rose significantly.  There are no federal conformity standards on weekly benefit 
amounts or duration.  However, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1996, 
p. 22) enunciated accepted benefit standards, stipulating that “each state should replace at least 
50 percent of lost earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum weekly benefit amount 
equal to two-thirds of the state’s average weekly wages.” The benefit cuts also mean that the 
nine states that chose to cut benefits have weaker countercyclical mechanisms to replace 
spending, and, following previous federal procedures, EUC benefits in any future recession 
would be reduced in proportion to the reductions in potential durations of regular state UI 
benefits. 
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Figure 5  Federal Shares of Total Unemployment Insurance Benefit Costs in Recession Years
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STATE BOND FINANCING 
Table 1 summarizes the year-end 2015 net reserve balances of the nine states that lowered their 
maximum potential durations of UI from 26 weeks.8  During and shortly after the Great 
Recession, Florida’s reserve balance fell to −$1.9 billion, before recovering to a positive $2.7 
billion by the end of 2015.  Georgia’s net reserves fell to −$631 million in 2011 but recovered to 
a positive $942 million by the end of 2015.  Michigan’s reserves hit a low of −$3.5 billion in 
2010, and Table 1 shows that reserves appear to have recovered substantially, to a positive $2.7 
billion, but Michigan’s bond debt of $2.2 billion remains outstanding.  Despite the 2015 year-end 
reserve positions listed in Table 1, our simulations suggest that only three of the nine states 
(Arkansas, Florida, and Kansas) have reserve positions sufficient to survive an “average” 
recession without borrowing.   
Table 1  Reserve Positions on December 31, 2015, of States That Reduced Maximum Duration of UI Benefits 
to Fewer Than 26 Weeks since 2011 
State 
2015 reserve position ($000s) Avg. recession 
peak-to-trough 





Arkansas 384,596 12,148,525 3.17 −2.80 
Florida 2,666,016 59,203,612 4.50 −2.48 
Georgia 941,924 38,375,907 2.45 −2.89 
Illinois 1,540,766 65,267,303 2.36 −5.96 
Kansas 456,523 20,351,646 2.24 −1.66 
Michigan 2,689,825 36,186,561 7.43 −8.40 
Missouri 377,527 28,733,510 1.31 −3.28 
North Carolina 1,362,916 63,435,148 2.15 −2.88 
South Carolina 307,378 22,178,827 1.39 −4.19 
a  The reserve ratio is based on USDOL (2016) published reserve positions of the states as of December 31, 2015, 
and estimated 2015 total taxable wages.  Taxable wages were estimated by taking the actual 2014 values and 
multiplying by the year-over-year percentage change in taxable wages for the first two quarters of 2015 (taxable 
wages for 2015Q1 plus 2015Q2 divided by taxable wages for 2014Q1 plus 2014Q2).   
b  Recessions include 2008–2009, 2001–2002, 1991–1992, 1980–1983 and 1974–1975.  For these five recessions, 
the peaks in business activity prior to the recession are designated as 2007, 2000, 1990, 1979, and 1973.  
Subsequent to these peak years, for each state, we search for the minimum net reserve balance and use that value to 
define the trough.  For each of the five recessions, the change in the reserve ratio is calculated by taking the change 
in the net reserve balance from peak to trough and dividing by peak-year taxable wages.  These five values are then 
averaged. 
SOURCE:  USDOL (2015, 2016) and authors’ computations. 
                                                 
8 This table does not account for state sales of revenue bonds to finance UI debt; only Title XII loans are figured 
into the balances listed.   
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The statutory mechanism for financing state UI benefit payment debts is loans from the 
U.S. Treasury under Title XII of the Social Security Act.  However, bond financing of UI 
debthas become increasingly popular among states.  The six states listed in Table 2 sold state 
revenue bonds in recent years to finance UI debt.  For example, in late 2011, Michigan repaid its 
$3.2 billion unemployment insurance debt to the U.S. Treasury by raising money through a bond 
sale.  At the time, Title XII loans were charging 2.94 percent, whereas the Michigan bonds were 
sold at an effective rate of 0.24.  This strategy is expected save Michigan close to $150 million 
over the term of the debt.  As Table 2 shows, Michigan’s outstanding debt to the private markets 
(including principal and interest) totaled $2.4 billion as of the fiscal year ending September 30, 
2015, with the final repayment of those bonds not expected until 2022.  While the official data as 
of last December 31 suggests that three states have negative net reserves, taking the bond data in 
Table 2 into consideration suggests four states are currently negative.9  Figure 6 summarizes 
Table 2  Net Reserves as of December 31, 2015, and Outstanding Bonds as of the Most Recent Fiscal Year 













Colorado 681.2   256.5 424.7 FY 2016–17 
Illinoisa 1,540.8 654.9 195.2 850.1 690.7 FY 2023–24 
Michigan 2,689.8   2,400.0 289.8 FY 2021–22 
Nevada 447.0 410.3 35.9 446.2 0.9 FY 2017–18 
Pennsylvania 966.8 2,230.2 485.7 2,715.9 −1,749.1 FY 2023–24 
Texasa 1,304.9   652.6 652.3 FY 2016–17 
       
 7,630.6   7,321.3 309.3  
NOTE: Data on state bond payments and balances are only available from state annual finance reports.  It would be 
valuable if the U.S. Department of Labor monitored state UI bond financing and balances and published such data 
on the doleta.gov/unemploy web page.   
a The interest amount for Illinois ($195.2 million) is the payment amount due in the current fiscal year, ending 
June 30, 2016.  Interest amounts for future years were not found in the documentation.  The documentation for 
Texas does not clarify whether the liability of $652.6 million includes all future interest payments; therefore, the 
total amount of principle and interest is slightly understated.  
SOURCE:  State-specific Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for fiscal year ending June 30, 2015:  Colorado, 
p. 103; Illinois, p. 97; Nevada, p. 66; and Pennsylvania, p. 105. For fiscal year ending September 30, 2015:  
Michigan, p. 119; and for fiscal year ending August 31, 2015:  Texas, p. 43.  For Michigan, also see 
http://michigan.gov/treasury/0,4679,7-121-1755_1963-268192--,00.html. 
                                                 
9 As of December 31, 2015, four states had outstanding Title XII debt, and six states had outstanding bonds 
requiring repayment (USDOL 2016, p. 63). 
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counts of states with negative net reserve positions along with simulation-based counts of states 
with negative net reserves after simulated recessions. 
SIMULATIONS OF STATE BORROWING IN A NEAR-TERM RECESSION 
Simulations of UI reserve balances experienced by states in mild, moderate, and severe 
recessions are based on the history from recessions in 2008–2009, 2001–2002, 1991–1992, 
1980–1983, and 1974–1975.  For these five recessions, the preceding peaks in business activity 
were designated as 2007, 2000, 1990, 1979, and 1973, respectively.  Subsequent to the peaks, we 
search for the minimum net reserve balance for each state and use that to define the reserve level 
in the following trough of the recession.  For each of the five recessions, the change in the 
reserve ratio is calculated by taking the change in the net reserve balance from peak to trough 
and dividing by peak-year taxable wages.  The dip in reserve ratio for an “average” recession is 
computed as the peak-to-trough drop in reserve ratio averaged over all five historical periods.  
The dip for a “mild” recession is the average drop during the 2001–2002 and 1991–1992 
recessions.  The dip for a “severe” recession is computed as the average over the 2008–2009, 
1980–1983, and 1974–1975 recessions.  
Simulations start with the official net reserve balances for each state at the end of 2015, 
adjusted for bond debt as the initial peak before a recession.  The simulations examine reserve 
ratios defined by taxable wages.10  Figure 6 summarizes the number of states that experience 
negative net reserves if a mild, moderate, or severe recession started in 2016.  The simulations 
suggest that 21, 24, and 30 states would have negative net reserves, respectively, if a 2016 
                                                 
10 Since wage data are only available through June 2015, data for the last two quarters of 2015 for each state 
were imputed from 2014 data. 
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recession were mild, moderate, or severe.  The count of 30 negative net reserve states is identical 
to the peak-year number of negative net reserve ratio states at the end of 2010, during the Great 
Recession. 
It should be noted that our simulations are based entirely on historic patterns of changes 
in reserve ratios.  The simulations include no adjustments for other factors that may have 
changed.  In particular, there are no adjustments for changes in potential benefit durations or 
weekly benefit amounts.  However, O’Leary (2012) reports that simulations based on cuts in 
benefit durations and amounts that have been implemented would reduce the countercyclical 
strength of UI benefit payments by up to two-thirds.  This reduction in spending would most 
likely lengthen the duration of any future recession and delay and weaken any economic 
recovery that were to follow a recession. 
 
SOURCE: USDOL (2015), sources listed for Table 2, and authors’ computations.   
 
Another graphic representation of the simulation results is given in Figure 7, which arrays 
states from lowest to highest net reserve ratio on taxable wages at year’s end for 2015, as 
represented by the black curve.  The upper green curve shows the pre–Great Recession reserve 























Figure 6  Number of States with Negative Reserves in 2015, and the Simulated 
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for each state should an average recession commence in 2016.  Just 17 states are currently at or 
above their 2007 reserve ratio levels, and, under an average recession scenario, the UI system as 
a whole is underfunded and would again heavily rely on borrowing to finance benefit payments.  
Dollar amounts for reserve balances for each state, currently and under simulated recession 
scenarios, are listed in Table 3, with associated reserve ratios listed in Table 4. 
CONCLUSION 
Our simulation analysis suggests that current levels of UI system reserves are not high 
enough to avoid a net negative position for the system if a recession should emerge in the 
coming months.  Even a relatively mild recession will generate debt for many states, and 
possibly for the whole system taken together.  There is a structural mismatch in the system 
between benefit payments and tax revenues that has worsened in recent years.  By accepted 
standards of adequacy, benefit levels and durations throughout the system are not excessive, but 
financing is inadequate.   
From a negative net reserve position in 2012, UI system net reserves recovered to $24.1 
billion by the end of 2015. However, this level is not sufficient to avoid systemic debt should a 
new recession emerge.  Simulated mild and severe recessions suggest that net system debts of 
$13.5 and $40.4 billion, respectively, will result.  During the Great Recession, systemwide 
indebtedness reached $30.7 billion in 2010.  Our simulations suggest that systemwide reserves 
need to be at least 2.5 percent of 2015 taxable wages to avoid a systemwide debt following a 
mild recession, and that they need to be over 4.0 percent of taxable wages to avoid a systemwide 





















































































































Net reserve ratio Average recession 2007 reserve ratio
Figure 7 Net Reserve Ratios of the 53 States and Territories in 2015, Their 2007 Reserve Ratios, and Their Simulated Reserve-Ratio Trough Values 
if an "Average" Recession Were to Occur in 2016
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Table 3  Reserve Positions of the States and Territories (accounting for bond debt) at Year’s End 2015, and 













      Overall 1.57 24,104,541 −13,508,086 −40,413,219 
       U.S. Virgin Islands −13.00 −69,667 −86,728 −107,705 
California −5.35 −6,397,495 −11,878,276 −12,514,106 
Pennsylvania −3.86 −1,749,100 −3,665,982 −6,207,812 
Ohio −1.01 −432,039 −1,484,974 −3,601,213 
Nevada 0.00 853 −299,970 −776,929 
Kentucky 0.02 3,501 −331,053 −890,029 
Indiana 0.10 26,645 −701,353 −1,475,316 
Connecticut 0.12 24,681 −871,697 −939,609 
New York 0.36 288,063 −3,073,813 −2,842,012 
Arizona 0.54 102,435 −218,456 −698,920 
Texas 0.61 652,295 −807,601 −2,217,652 
Michigan 0.80 289,825 −1,411,928 −3,640,364 
Illinois 1.06 690,682 −1,586,523 −4,275,739 
Delaware 1.19 72,368 −76,131 −288,337 
West Virginia 1.21 82,372 56,627 −305,601 
North Dakota 1.23 132,881 57,781 −3,923 
Missouri 1.31 377,527 −558,004 −570,281 
South Carolina 1.39 307,378 −248,060 −870,046 
New Jersey 1.42 1,194,644 −1,543,613 −1,737,459 
Colorado 1.45 424,743 −37,091 −688,624 
Rhode Island 1.82 131,921 −105,469 −298,587 
Massachusetts 1.89 925,787 −1,424,242 −252,235 
New Mexico 1.93 250,993 272,566 −8,061 
North Carolina 2.15 1,362,916 216,428 −921,026 
South Dakota 2.16 99,458 65,589 35,424 
Kansas 2.24 456,523 216,817 54,043 
Wisconsin 2.40 746,895 −25,540 −1,751,845 
Georgia 2.45 941,924 118,242 −356,152 
Virginia 2.77 769,647 129,530 54,750 
Minnesota 3.10 1,664,584 701,918 −281,842 
Alabama 3.13 445,381 226,519 −18,611 
Arkansas 3.17 384,596 188,891 −52,231 
Montana 3.29 309,990 311,723 69,148 
Iowa 3.41 943,250 853,076 44,447 
Hawaii 3.45 474,739 249,186 145,887 
Idaho 3.46 458,989 294,380 177,264 
Utah 3.55 946,273 780,505 323,879 
Tennessee 3.74 915,945 589,219 281,038 
New Hampshire 4.07 289,375 147,027 82,631 
Florida 4.50 2,666,016 1,772,837 815,567 
Maryland 4.77 957,921 480,682 173,513 
Mississippi 4.81 599,570 509,945 330,845 
Oklahoma 4.90 1,153,136 965,010 536,971 
Washington 4.99 3,873,638 2,467,206 1,991,028 
Nebraska 5.15 390,813 358,764 279,373 
Alaska 5.61 447,613 373,328 435,547 
Louisiana 6.01 904,485 891,736 −27,301 
Maine 6.28 356,865 254,513 197,237 
Vermont 6.50 230,963 99,863 399 
District of Columbia 6.88 351,252 290,597 159,469 
Wyoming 6.90 345,994 360,842 211,638 
Oregon 7.41 2,843,549 2,286,436 1,537,631 
Puerto Rico 9.01 440,946 340,633 268,619 




Table 4  Reserve Positions of the State and Territories (accounting for bond debt) at Year’s End 2015, and 











Overall 1,535,584,592 1.57 −0.88 −2.63 
U.S. Virgin Islands 536,094 −13.00 −16.18 −20.09 
California 119,570,755 −5.35 −9.93 −10.47 
Pennsylvania 45,328,373 −3.86 −8.09 −13.70 
Ohio 42,736,366 −1.01 −3.47 −8.43 
Nevada 26,564,907 0.00 −1.13 −2.92 
Kentucky 16,434,180 0.02 −2.01 −5.42 
Indiana 25,826,656 0.10 −2.72 −5.71 
Connecticut 20,097,418 0.12 −4.34 −4.68 
New York 80,449,092 0.36 −3.82 −3.53 
Arizona 18,897,304 0.54 −1.16 −3.70 
Texas 106,242,853 0.61 −0.76 −2.09 
Michigan 36,186,561 0.80 −3.90 −10.06 
Illinois 65,267,303 1.06 −2.43 −6.55 
Delaware 6,081,214 1.19 −1.25 −4.74 
West Virginia 6,820,375 1.21 0.83 −4.48 
North Dakota 10,800,064 1.23 0.54 −0.04 
Missouri 28,733,510 1.31 −1.94 −1.98 
South Carolina 22,178,827 1.39 −1.12 −3.92 
New Jersey 84,336,717 1.42 −1.83 −2.06 
Colorado 29,213,849 1.45 −0.13 −2.36 
Rhode Island 7,237,556 1.82 −1.46 −4.13 
Massachusetts 48,866,674 1.89 −2.91 −0.52 
New Mexico 12,997,376 1.93 2.10 −0.06 
North Carolina 63,435,148 2.15 0.34 −1.45 
South Dakota 4,610,128 2.16 1.42 0.77 
Kansas 20,351,646 2.24 1.07 0.27 
Wisconsin 31,152,234 2.40 −0.08 −5.62 
Georgia 38,375,907 2.45 0.31 −0.93 
Virginia 27,812,529 2.77 0.47 0.20 
Minnesota 53,696,579 3.10 1.31 −0.52 
Alabama 14,244,122 3.13 1.59 −0.13 
Arkansas 12,148,525 3.17 1.55 −0.43 
Montana 9,411,217 3.29 3.31 0.73 
Iowa 27,642,606 3.41 3.09 0.16 
Hawaii 13,750,985 3.45 1.81 1.06 
Idaho 13,251,043 3.46 2.22 1.34 
Utah 26,661,110 3.55 2.93 1.21 
Tennessee 24,463,271 3.74 2.41 1.15 
New Hampshire 7,115,823 4.07 2.07 1.16 
Florida 59,203,612 4.50 2.99 1.38 
Maryland 20,087,659 4.77 2.39 0.86 
Mississippi 12,463,478 4.81 4.09 2.65 
Oklahoma 23,525,174 4.90 4.10 2.28 
Washington 77,562,481 4.99 3.18 2.57 
Nebraska 7,588,448 5.15 4.73 3.68 
Alaska 7,982,012 5.61 4.68 5.46 
Louisiana 15,045,194 6.01 5.93 −0.18 
Maine 5,682,751 6.28 4.48 3.47 
Vermont 3,552,731 6.50 2.81 0.01 
District of Columbia 5,102,786 6.88 5.69 3.13 
Wyoming 5,013,258 6.90 7.20 4.22 
Oregon 38,352,163 7.41 5.96 4.01 
Puerto Rico 4,895,947 9.01 6.96 5.49 




The inadequacy of forward funding for UI benefits has induced some states to reduce 
benefit durations, and in one case the maximum weekly benefit amount was reduced, too.  
Forward funding of UI benefits helps improve the automatic countercyclical functioning of the 
UI benefit and tax system.  If many states were to respond to the USDOL incentive of zero 
interest for short-term loans for maintaining year-end reserves at least at the average high cost 
rate, then individual state and overall system reserve adequacy would improve.  Some states have 
adopted a pay-as-you-go UI benefit financing approach.  This is a cost-saving strategy in the 
current low-interest-rate environment, but it could present systemic risks and have procyclical 
effects should interest rates rise.  A hindrance to adequate UI benefit system finance is the low 
federal taxable wage base.   
The federal-state UI system was established during the Great Depression by the Social 
Security Act of 1935.  The taxable wage base is the foundation for adequate forward funding of 
UI benefits.  The $7,000 federal taxable wage base, which was equal to the Social Security 
taxable wage base when the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) was enacted, is now less 
than 6 percent of the Social Security level.  The FUTA wage base sets the minimum taxable 
wage standard for states, and 90 percent of FUTA taxes are returned to the states to pay regular 
benefits.  The 10 percent of FUTA revenues retained by the federal partner forms the basis for 
funding public employment services, state administration of UI programs, and the federal reserve 
for loans to states.  Boosting the FUTA tax base would nudge states to improve forward funding 
of benefits, restore the reemployment emphasis of UI programs, and support better information 
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